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PREFACE
On 12 December 2003, the European Council approved Javier Solana’s Euro-
pean Security Strategy. Few EU documents represent such a clear – and clearly-
worded – advance in thinking. Since its adoption, the Commission, the Council
and the Member States have all made progress on security cooperation. In June
2004, the European Council has taken further decisions in the field of security.
It is not always clear though whether this represents the conscious implementa-
tion of the Strategy or an unstructured process of piece-meal change. In the
short-term, recent developments have certainly been positive – but if they are
not tied to long-term strategic goals, they may prove unsustainable.
Thus there is room for an intellectual review of the direction we have taken. The
Foreign Policy Centre (London), British Council Brussels, New Defence Agenda
(Brussels) and the Royal Institute for International Relations (Brussels) joined
together to organize a seminar on the implementation of the Strategy. On 30
June 2004 the Audit of European Strategy brought together key policy-makers
from within the European institutions and original thinkers on strategic
issues. A first, analysts’ panel debated concrete recommendations to anchor the
Strategy’s innovative comprehensive approach to security into policy practice. A
second, practitioners’ panel reviewed ongoing and future elaboration of the
Strategy in the fields of CFSP, ESDP and Community matters. 
In this Egmont Paper contributions by the day’s speakers are published. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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The four organisers have been, and still are, actively involved in the debate on
the Strategy. The Foreign Policy Centre and British Council Brussels are jointly
responsible for the Global Europe programme, devised to promote new think-
ing on the EU’s evolution as an international actor. The programme has been
supported by the European Commission Representation in the UK as part of
The Future of Europe project. New Defence Agenda offers a well-known Brus-
sels platform for thought-provoking analysis and debate. At the request of the
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Institute for International Rela-
tions has produced a Belgian contribution to the elaboration of the Strategy –
which has been published in this series as Egmont Paper No. 1 – and has recently
published  The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive
Approach to Security. 
Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP, 
Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for International Relations
Richard GOWAN, 
Research Fellow, The Foreign Policy Centre
Kate ARTHURS, 
British Council Brussels 
Linda KARVINEN, 
Project Manager, New Defence AgendaAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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1. IMPLEMENTING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
Dr. Christoph Heusgen
Director, Policy Unit, Council of the European Union
The European Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2003 by the
European Council, serves three functions. Firstly, it provides a frame of refer-
ence both for long-term strategies and for current political problems. Secondly,
it is a basis for consultation with major partners on central strategic issues.
Thirdly, it leads to concrete follow-up in five areas identified by the European
Council: (1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (2) the fight against
terrorism, (3) effective multilateralism with the UN at its core, (4) a strategy
towards the region of the Middle East, and (5) a comprehensive policy towards
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where do we stand on these five issues?
On WMD the European Union has adopted a comprehensive strategy which is
being implemented. On terrorism, as a consequence of the attacks in Madrid,
the European Council on 25 and 26 March 2004 agreed on a wide-ranging
Declaration reaffirming the EU's determination to systematically confront the
terrorist threat. The appointment of an EU counter-terrorism coordinator will
help to improve coordination and visibility of EU actions in this field. Progress
has been achieved on a number of third pillar directives and regulations (Direc-
tive on compensating victims of crime, Regulation on the Schengen Information
System, Decision establishing the Visa Information System, Europol and Euro-
just agreement) as well as on the prospect of integrating in the Council Secretar-
iat an intelligence capacity on all aspects of the terrorist threat. In March, the
European Council also brought forward the solidarity clause thus anticipating
the Constitutional Treaty.
The European Council meeting in June 2004 registered the relevant progress
made in the three other areas. It welcomed the focus on effective multilateralism,
with transmission of the EU’s contribution to the UN Secretary General’s High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in support of a strengthened UN
and the work on implementing the EU-UN Joint Declaration on Co-operation
in Crisis Management of 24 September 2003. The UN is at the core of the EU’s
concerted efforts to re-launch multilateralism as a general and widely-accepted
method to conduct international relations. The EU’s action, though, focuses alsoAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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on other international and regional organisations through institution-building
and transfer of expertise. Recently, in the context of its engagement in Sudan,
the EU has stepped up its efforts to strengthen the African Union. ECOWAS is
also supported by the EU. The participation of High Representative Javier
Solana at the head of the EU delegation in the Asian Regional Forum underlined
the EU’s efforts to also strengthen Asian regional organizations. 
The European Council endorsed the Report of the Presidency, the High Repre-
sentative and the Commission on the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the region
of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which will establish a consistent
basis for the EU’s policies towards the countries concerned by setting out general
principles and objectives. Finally, it adopted a comprehensive policy towards
Bosnia and Herzegovina, centred on the SFOR-follow-up mission to Bosnia to
begin in December 2004 under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements with NATO. 
Many of these efforts point to the fulfilment of another of the main objectives
of the European Security Strategy: to contribute to stability and good govern-
ance in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. The Balkans, within Europe, remain
the first area of engagement for the EU with three successful operations (two
policing operations in Bosnia and Macedonia and a military operation in the
latter). While the focus has been mainly on Bosnia, the EU presence and action
has been relevant also in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia. 
The EU is actively engaged in crisis management in both its most immediate and
far neighbourhood. As a member of the Quartet, the EU is seeking solutions to
the Middle East conflict. It is also deeply engaged in Afghanistan, the Middle
East, the South Caucasus and the African Great Lakes Region (a fourth military
operation was carried out in Congo in 2003). Through the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy, the EU is stepping up its action in the areas on its Southern and
Eastern borders, to help increase security and stability in these regions.
Implementing the European Security Strategy implies that the EU must be more
active, more capable, and more coherent. In order to be more active and capa-
ble, the EU has concentrated on the development of a range of instruments and
capabilities. Following on the four successful operations conducted in 2003, the
EU is strengthening its ESDP through the establishment of the European
Defence Agency, the work on the ‘battlegroup concept’ and the Headline Goal
2010, the setting up of a Civil-Military Planning Cell and an operations centre
for the conduct of autonomous EU operations. In the civilian field, the build upAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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of capabilities for the strengthening of the rule of law, institution building, polic-
ing and civilian protection have also been carried forward. 
Early, rapid and sometimes, robust intervention is tantamount to turning the EU
into a fully effective actor on the global scene. Military intervention, however, is
only the last resort of EU policy. For the latter to work, coherence between
means and ends is indispensable. If the EU wants to assume responsibility for
global security, it must be more coherent. It must bring together the different
instruments and capabilities: military and civilian capabilities from the Member
States but also existing instruments such as the European Development Fund
and the European assistance programmes. Implementing the European Security
Strategy means also to proceed on the road to a more coherent and effective
institutional framework. The creation of the office of an EU Foreign Minister as
foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty will give the CFSP a higher profile, more
continuity and greater effectiveness. The establishment of a European External
Action Service will improve coherence by strengthening the representation of
European interests in third countries. In fact, the External Action Service, to
include staff from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member
States, will convert the European Commission's existing delegation offices into
fully-fledged EU representations. 
The analysis of the new threats to security and the corresponding strategic
objectives contained in the Strategy make it a fundamental framework and a
constant point of reference for both in-depth political consultations with part-
ners and relations with media and public opinion. Consultations in the form of
planning staff talks have been carried out with Moscow, Beijing and Washing-
ton. Both similarities and differences regarding our strategic objectives have
emerged. 
Against the prospect of being rapidly forgotten, the success of the European
Security Strategy, often cited by the media and used as a reference document for
politicians and diplomats, proves how much this text was needed at a time when
the EU embarked on the greatest ever enlargement and the deepest institutional
re-organisation of its history. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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2. THE EU, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND 
SECURITY: STRATEGIC PARTNERS OR 
CONVENIENT ALIBIS?
Richard Gowan
Europe Programme Researcher, The Foreign Policy Centre, London1
Of all the clichés surrounding debates on the European Security Strategy, the
most common may be that even if the EU is still an uncertain actor, it is already
an attractive model. Robert Kagan might argue that Europeans have become so
engrossed in their mutual affairs that they fail to understand the world beyond
their borders. They can respond that their need to look outwards is reduced by
the fact that the world is looking in, and enviously: ‘Elsewhere, what in Europe
has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN,
NAFTA and MERCOSUR […] suggest at least the desire for a postmodern envi-
ronment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is
undoubtedly easier than invention’.2
In the period of the Prodi Commission, European leaders have desired not only
to be imitated, but to be proactive in teaching others the art of imitation. Thus
Chris Patten has declared that ‘the EU’s ambition must be to reflect abroad what
is best about our own model’.3 
Yet this is as problematic as it is appealing. For Patten, the best feature of Europe
is ‘our sense of civil society’. In a period when the EU is deliberately emphasising
its nascent security identity, its dialogues with regional and international organ-
isations cannot be confined to social norms or even economic matters. They
must include harder issues of order, defence and stability. As the European order
alters, to what extent should it encourage other regional organisations to take
up increasing security responsibilities?
This article argues that the EU is developing a strategy that gives increasing
significance to other regional organizations in maintaining global stability – but
1. I would like to thank Sven Biscop, Phoebe Griffith, Jennifer Moll and Ben Koppelman for their
advice on this piece.
2. Robert Cooper, ‘The Post-modern State’, Re-ordering the World, The Foreign Policy Centre,
London, 2002.
3. Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream, Penguin USA, 2004.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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also that these may prove to be alibis rather than partners for the ‘more active’
Europe of the Security Strategy. Unless we tie the regionalisation of security to
an increase in our own global reach, it may reduce rather than enhance our
influence.
I. Towards Regionalism? 
The Evolution of European Rhetoric
The Security Strategy is vague on the issue of regionalisation. While it empha-
sises the EU’s commitment to an effective and legitimate United Nations, it is
wary of the subject of regional organisations. 
The first public draft of the Strategy highlighted the fact that ‘ASEAN, MER-
COSUR and the African Union are important partners’ for the EU, but the final
version merely noted that these organisations ‘make an important contribution
to a more orderly world’.1 As I have noted elsewhere, the implication that the
EU should be an agent for regionalisation has been edited out.2
This was not a total surprise. Had the Strategy dwelt on regional organisations,
it might have sparked uncomfortable debates over the EU’s relations with
NATO in keeping the world orderly (even if it does praise NATO as well as the
OSCE and the Council of Europe). Nor can the EU point to its previous inter-
actions with other regional organisations with unmitigated pride: its 1997 deci-
sion to suspend bloc-to-bloc political dialogue with ASEAN over Burma was not
merely controversial, but ultimately ineffective.
But in spite of the final Strategy’s relative coyness on regionalisation, it does
contain a clear recognition of the phenomenon’s importance. The final draft
underlines the threats of both regional conflicts and failing states to global secu-
rity, and warns: ‘Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in deal-
ing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or with-
out regional support, as in different ways our experience in both the Balkans
and West Africa shows’.
1. The first draft of the Strategy was presented in Thessalonica on 20 June 2003; the final version
was approved in Brussels on 12 December 2003. All quotations are from the final draft, unless
indicated otherwise. 
2. Mark Leonard & Richard Gowan, Global Europe: Implementing the Security Strategy, The For-
eign Policy Centre, London, 2004.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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This emphasis on regionalism as conflict resolution reflects a growing preference
in the UN for devolving peace-keeping and enforcement duties to regional
groupings (justifiable under Chapter VIII of its charter). It is easy – probably too
easy – for Europeans to frame this preference in terms of Franco-German peace.
But, more concretely, it also links to the emergence of a potentially effective
regional organization in one area of concern to both the UN and the EU: Africa. 
The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 to replace the largely sclerotic
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was widely welcomed by European
observers, not least because it demonstrated a particularly clear desire to ‘imi-
tate’ the European model. This was institutional as well as rhetorical: the AU
boasts its own Commission, and its leaders and officials have developed good
relationships with their European equivalents.1 
The European Commission has been generous in its support for the AU’s insti-
tution-building. There is probably a degree of institutional self-interest in this
approach. The Commission is reported to view its bilateral relationship with its
African counterpart as a significant opportunity to win political leverage in
Africa, too often seen as the preserve of former colonial powers such as the UK
and France. 
The AU’s institutional ambitions hark back to earlier EU-Africa agreements: the
Lomé Convention contained clauses on promoting regional cooperation. But
the AU is attractive not only because it advances that cooperation, but because
of its ostensibly serious desire to make Africa more responsible for its own secu-
rity concerns. One goal of the AU is the deployment of observers and peacekeep-
ing forces in regional trouble-spots – I will return to the key example of Darfur
below. In April 2004, the European Commission confirmed the creation of a
250 million Euro ‘Peace Facility’ to help fund AU operations.
While the Peace Facility has intentional limitations (it cannot cover the cost of
armaments, for example), the EU’s cooperation with the AU does represent a
strategic innovation. It combines a European commitment to the systemic
aspects of ‘effective multilateralism’ with a more case-specific approach to pre-
venting and ending conflicts. It was not, therefore, a surprise that the EU’s June
2004 Paper for Submission to the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
1. For a useful overview of the AU’s potential see Alex de Waal, ‘The African State and Global
Governance’, in Phoebe Griffith (ed.), Unbinding Africa, The Foreign Policy Centre, London,
2003.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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and Change made far fuller reference to regionalism than the earlier Strategy:
‘The Panel should also have regard to the increasing capacity and readiness of
regional organizations to act in support of international peace and security. The
UN should intensify its co-operation with such organizations’.1
Central to the argument is an acceptance that Europe should be an active agent
for regionalisation. The Paper notes that the EU ‘is ready to assist regional
organizations to enhance their capacity’ and is minded to go further: ‘It has
established an African Peace Facility and is engaged with the African Union on
making it operational and is considering other possibilities to support regional
organizations’ efforts on peace and security’.
II. Do Regional Organizations Save Lives? 
The Case of Darfur
Strategic innovation on paper does not, however, mean increased security on the
ground. As the Council’s contribution to the High-Level Panel was under prep-
aration, the scale of the ongoing killing in the Sudanese province of Darfur
(whether defined as genocide or otherwise) was becoming ever clearer. On 28
May 2004, ten days after the Paper had been approved for transmission to the
High-Level Panel, the AU requested 12 million Euro from the Peace Facility for
operations in Sudan.2 
This was the start of a process that would lead to the AU receiving a further 80
million Euro for operations in Darfur from the Peace Facility in October 2004.3
This process has been a crucial trial of the AU’s capacity to tie its regionalisation
agenda to security and peace-making. It has also been an important test of the
EU’s ability to work with another regional organization on security issues. The
performance of both Unions raises significant questions over their strategies. 
Thorough accounts of Darfur are now widely available.4 All emphasize the
moral challenge the crisis has posed to the international community. It is worth
adding that it has also represented a serious strategic challenge to the EU.
Although ostensibly isolated, events in Sudan and neighbouring Chad may have
1. Paper approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 17-18 May, 2004. 
2. http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/lv/article_3566_lv.htm.
3. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1306&for-
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=enAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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the potential to destabilise an area of significant European concern: the Great
Lakes region of Central Africa.
In addition to this geopolitical consideration, the outcome of the Darfur crisis is
significant to the EU’s broader strategic goals. In 2003, the EU boosted both its
own credibility and that of the international system through Artemis, its UN-
mandated crisis management in North-Eastern Congo. Praised as a success ‘in
all respects’, Artemis created optimism that the Strategy’s concepts of ‘robust’
intervention and ‘effective multilateralism’ would be validated in central
Africa.1 Failure over Darfur must weaken this hope. 
This impression has been reinforced not only by the EU’s support for the AU,
but also by developments in European military thinking. The February 2004
proposal that the EU should develop joint ‘battlegroups’ for peace operations,
initiated by the UK and France, is of particular relevance to Africa. The size of
the battlegroups – 1,500 soldiers each, with an operational lifetime of three
months – appears to be calibrated for missions such as Artemis, rather than
future Bosnias or Afghanistans. In EU military circles, they are typically associ-
ated with Africa.
The battlegroups can be seen as a natural adjunct to the Peace Facility. The
concepts were devised and approved separately, but it is easy to imagine how
they might be drawn together, with the small but state-of-the-art EU force acting
as a flexible precursor to a larger but less technically advanced AU contingent.
The G8’s June 2003 initiative to support an African Standby Force, to be ready
by 2010, represents another step towards such security cooperation.2 
Although the battlegroups will not exist until 2007, a similar type of European
force could have been put together on an ad hoc basis for Darfur. France and
Britain have built up considerable experience of operating with ECOWAS
peace-keepers in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, a good basis for partnership
4. See those of the International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisweb.org/home/
index.cfm?id=1230&l=1) and Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=africa). See also
Greg Austin & Ben Koppelman, Darfur and Genocide: mechanisms for rapid response, an end to
impunity, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2004. This article was originally written in late
August 2004, and reviewed in September and early November – its comments on the crisis should
be read in this context.
1. Jean-Yves Haine et al, European Defence, a proposal for a white paper, EU Institute for Security
Studies, Paris, 2004.
2. See Vanessa Kent & Mark Malan, ‘The Africa Standby Force’, African Security Review Vol.
12(3), 2003 at http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/E2.html. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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with the AU. In April 2004, the outgoing head of the EU Military Staff expressed
his interest in an Artemis-style venture in Sudan.
Thus Darfur provided an opportunity to prove not only the worth of the Strat-
egy, but also of more concrete European initiatives. In reality, the European
States have demonstrated little political will to take this opportunity. There have
been no sustained efforts to prepare an Artemis-type force for Sudan. Moreover,
relations with the AU have indicated the current limitations of support for
regionalism.
Throughout 2004, discussions of Darfur have been constrained by the desire to
sustain peace negotiations to resolve Sudan’s larger Southern civil war. But
European officials have also argued that Darfur is an opportunity for Africans
to make peace in Africa, and that the AU should be encouraged to take respon-
sibility for the crisis. The European Commission encouraged and funded the
AU’s 2003-2004 peace-keeping mission in Burundi – Darfur has presented a
chance to develop this precedent. 
When, following a deeply flawed ceasefire, the AU made its May request for
Peace Facility support for a monitoring mission to Darfur, the EU’s members
released the requested funds within two weeks. European Commissioner for
Development Poul Nielson underlined the significance of this commitment to
regionalism: ‘The Peace Facility is a new instrument that could become an
important tool in the construction of the new peace and security agenda in
Africa. Member States have today shown that they are willing to allow this new
instrument to play just that role and that the EU will be a credible partner in the
African Union’s aspirations to assume the necessary leadership of this peace and
security agenda’.1
To underline the EU’s commitment to that strategy, it designated a small number
of monitors to accompany the AU mission. Here was a practical demonstration
of European financial generosity being combined with a wish to give others
strategic primacy for the sake of security. The much larger October grant indi-
cated that this approach is not merely of symbolic value, but is a real, consider-
able and sustained strategic initiative.
1. See http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/lv/article_3566_lv.htm. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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Nor is it an unwise strategy. Independent observers of Darfur have typically
concluded that ‘the political commitment shown by the AU leadership is com-
mendable, despite a sometimes uneven performance’.1 However, two factors
militated against this commitment being translated into a rapid improvement of
the situation in Darfur. 
One has been practical. Even with the current level of European support, the
AU’s limited resources have proved to be a constraint. Although a first group of
monitors are now on the ground, ‘voices in the international community are
concerned whether the AU is sufficiently robust to carry out its mandate, given
the massive geographical size of the Darfur region’.2 
The second – and greater – problem has been political. The AU has refrained
from taking a tough line on Darfur without the co-operation of the Sudanese
government. Given that the government is almost certainly the ultimate cause of
the crisis, this has been a highly problematic approach. While the AU’s presence
in Darfur is expanding (with a force of 3000 projected at the time of writing), it
continues to prioritise maintenance of relations with Khartoum. The latter has
duly indicated that it prefers the AU’s efforts to solve the crisis ‘in an African
context’ to the involvement of the UN.3
These efforts have not been fruitless. As this article goes to press, AU-sponsored
talks have resulted in agreements between the Sudanese government and rebels
on security and humanitarian issues in Darfur.4 But, while the international
community has welcomed this ‘breakthrough’, it comes in a context of contin-
ued breaches of international law (including the forcible movement of refugees)
and the estimated Darfur death-toll at 70 000. The AU’s political engagement
with Sudan should not be dismissed lightly, but diplomatic gradualism has had
a heavy price.
III. Regionalism’s Flaws – and Europe’s
The Darfur crisis has thus underlined two simple but sizeable dangers in the
strategy of promoting regionalism. The first is to assume that relatively under-
1. International Crisis Group, Darfur deadline: a new international action plan, 23 August 2004.
2. Austin & Koppelman, op. cit.
3. BBC, ‘Sudan grudgingly accepts UN vote’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3670590.stm. 
4. BBC, ‘“Breakthrough” deal for Darfur’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3996859.stm.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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developed regional organizations have the institutional capacity and resources
to manage major crises. The second is to forget that the political imperatives
within such organizations may prevent them from taking even those steps within
their capacity.
If ‘effective multilateralism’ is to be based on regionalization, we must recognise
that the political problem will persist. Ultimately, regional organizations will
often follow the dictates of local politics, not those of international pacts and
treaties (as demonstrated by Europe’s own Stability Pact). In the field of peace
and security, regional political co-operation can obstruct as well as enable effec-
tive action: ‘The UN norm is that regional actors should be encouraged to
engage in all types of peace operations, but the remit and authority should
derive from the Security Council. For regional actors, the norm is slightly differ-
ent: they will engage selectively in different types of peace operations’.1
For the AU, this sort of selectivity remains tied to the sheer number of ongoing
conflicts affecting the continent, and the Great Lakes region in particular. Indi-
vidual interventions and peace operations cannot provide a political solution to
interlinked conflicts spread across so many States. Commitments to regional
peace-keeping are not guarantees of good intentions: the two African countries
readiest to offer monitors for Darfur have been Rwanda and Nigeria, both
known to use regional instabilities to their advantage.
Political considerations can also exacerbate pre-existing problems of capacity.
‘Even if there is a will to develop a clear and operational common defence policy
and standby capacities’, it has been warned, ‘the political nature of African
bureaucracies may negatively influence the military professionalism of African
forces’.2 Strategic partnership with the AU may be necessary and desirable, but
its member’s tactics must be treated with caution. 
But the Darfur experience should act as a reminder that Europe can also be
political in its approach to security. The internal process of European policy-
making, with States and institutions, has militated against an assertive response
to the crisis. 
1. Louise Fawcett, ‘The Evolving Architecture of Regionalization’, in Michael Pugh & Waheguru
Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), The United Nations and Regional Security, Boulder, London, 2003.
2. Kent & Malan, op. cit. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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If, as suggested above, the European Commission has worked closely with the
AU to gain leverage relative to powers such as France, Paris is generally thought
to have been an obstacle to a harder line on Sudan. More generally, the possibil-
ity of European military commitment might have strengthened the AU earlier in
the year, but the Strategy’s belief in early and robust intervention was over-
looked. While the EU’s members have discussed sanctions against Sudan, their
threats have lacked breadth and conviction.
Effective multilateralism has appeared not to be a principle for all seasons – and
killing has continued in Darfur.
IV. Can Regionalism be Credible? 
Comparing the EU’s developing paper commitment to regionalism as a security
policy with events in Darfur, it is possible to reach one of two conclusions. The
pessimist will argue that crises such as Darfur undermine the ambitions of the
Strategy and the Paper submitted to the High-Level Panel. The optimist might
respond that, tragic as such crises are, the general trend towards regionalization
represents underlying progress towards the ‘postmodern environment’. If that
environment ‘is unlikely to be realized quickly’, it may be better to allow it to
develop through failures as well as through its successes. 
This is not a morally satisfying position. Nor is it a strategically advisable one.
An accumulation of crises in the Great Lakes region and its periphery might
allow the AU to develop new crisis management capacities – but it might also
undermine the AU itself. 
If the EU is to develop security partnerships with other regional organizations,
it must search for policies that allow it to affect their responses to crises. I have
previously suggested that the EU should do more in terms of de facto military
assistance to the AU and other suitable organizations. This should not only
expand their capacities but be tied to projects for military professionalism.
While the Peace Facility is clearly a positive reform in this direction (and the
passage from the Paper submitted to the High-Level Panel cited earlier demon-
strates a constructive approach to this question), Darfur suggests that the offer
of money may not always be enough to galvanise the political will of others.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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The EU cannot, of course, be seen to develop a ‘new colonialism’, asking others’
young men to die for its security concerns. In the case of Sudan, an early EU
military commitment (even if threatened rather than immediately deployed)
might have made a significant impact, but it might also have been politically
offensive to the AU. In dealing with regional organizations, the EU must develop
trust in its intentions towards post-colonial areas.
One way to achieve this must be to pursue substantive security discussions with
them, to discover the nuances and limitations of their commitments – and our
own. The AU, with a new Peace and Security Council in place, remains a good
place to start. Discussions might include:
• Formalised joint long-term analyses of potential crises, possibly con-
ducted within a joint EU/AU secretariat responsible for directing the
already large sums of European money available for conflict-preven-
tion in Africa;
• Regular multilateral military staff conferences between leading Afri-
can and European States, co-ordinated by the European Union Mili-
tary Staff, to discuss and plan interventions in States at risk of failure;
• In the short term, efforts should be focussed not only on the over-
whelming priority of ending the killing in Darfur, but on a joint AU-
EU ‘lessons learned and analysis’ exercise.
Ultimately, none of these innovations can make the impact on African stability
that more politically difficult European gestures such as trade reform could
achieve. But, as the EU and AU both develop as security actors, they must ensure
that their partnership is effective. This would be another success that other
organizations might wish to imitate.AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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3. VENUS WITHOUT MARS: 
CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR ESDP
Dr. Jean-Yves Haine1
Senior Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Europe is at a crossroads. Among the clouds of abstention, apathy and doubts
about the European integration project displayed by the last European election,
the new Commission has to restore the credibility and the efficiency of an insti-
tution whose legitimacy is contested by the European public and, more crucially,
by some Member States. Moreover, the precarious ratification process of the
Constitution will yet again launch the Union in an introspective exercise, which
by nature would favour the critics more than the converts. The series of refer-
enda would ultimately be decided by national electoral geography rather than
by a truly European debate. Discussions about the Union’s budget, agricultural
and tax reforms or trade liberalisation will be strenuous given the poor state of
public finances in a majority of countries. The next wave of enlargement,
because it will primarily concern Turkish membership, will trigger a renewed
debate about Europe’s raison d’être and core values and will in all likelihood
increase tensions and disagreements among Member States. Briefly put, there is
the danger of an ever more inward-looking Europe in a very uncertain and frag-
ile international context that demands a more responsible and active Union.
This gap represents by far the most difficult challenge for the Union: how to
deepen its integration process without limiting its external action, how to rec-
oncile this introspection with increased responsibilities? With the recent enlarge-
ment, remote theatres like Moldova or the Caucasus have become Europe’s
direct neighbourhood. The crisis over Iraq is still throwing its shadow over the
project of a more coherent foreign policy and, more broadly, divergent attitudes
regarding US foreign policies still divide the Union. All these issues will increase
opportunities for the sceptics to disapprove of and even reject the European
integration process. And yet, the European project is the fundamental basis of
our prosperity, and increasingly of our security. 
1. The author is writing here in his personal capacity. His last book, Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin
d’alliés?, published last March by Payot, received the France-Amérique Prize 2004. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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I. Soft Power Plus
Widely discussed among experts and officials but barely noticed by the Euro-
pean public, the European Security Strategy is nonetheless a crucial step toward
a more responsible Union in security affairs. For the first time, the Union has
begun to think strategically. The process of European integration has resulted in
a ‘post-modern’ system where a genuine democratic peace was built, an institu-
tional order was progressively constructed and an increasingly ‘amalgamated
security community’ has emerged.1 With the Strategy, the external dimension of
this process is addressed for the first time. The document in essence was a wake-
up call after the deep divisions among Union’s members regarding Iraq and an
attempt to bridge the gap with Washington on global issues. The opening
premise of the document is a basic recognition that ‘the European Union is inev-
itably a global actor […] Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility
for global security and in building a better world’.2 In short, the Union could
not have postponed its strategic dimension any longer, it could not anymore
seem to be a ‘pole of indifference’, especially when the ‘pole of power’, i.e. the
US, was engaged in a global and revolutionary agenda for world affairs.3 
A strategy document is always a tentative exercise by nature. It is more about a
vision than about strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. The
European Security Strategy is no exception in this regard. While it offers rela-
tively specific definitions of the threats faced by the Union, it is rather vague and
cautious on the ways to address them. For example, the concept of ‘pre-emptive’
engagement was replaced by a ‘preventive’ one, because the original wording
was deemed too controversial for some members, especially Germany. Likewise,
some countries underlined the persistence of old Bosnian-type security risks
while others were keen to stress the new rising threats of terrorism and WMD
proliferation. As far as the instruments were concerned, there was an intense
debate between a hawkish perception of world problems and a softer view of
1. The term was first coined by Karl Deutsch, ‘Political Community at the International Level:
Problems of Definition and Measurement’, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, Princeton University,
September 1953, n°2, pp. 1-25. It was subsequently developed in Karl Deutsch et al., Political
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical
Experience, Princeton University Press, 1957. 
2. Emphasis added. 
3. See the seminal article by Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Essays in International
Politics, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1962, pp. 81-102. On the revolutionary
character of Bush’s foreign policies, see among others, Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Amer-
ica Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington,
2003. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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the exercise of European power. These debates were for the most part healthy
and fruitful. They helped to enhance the consciousness among European leaders
and officials that, in order to fulfil its full international role, the EU cannot
reduce itself to its civilian component, however important. Such concepts as
‘preventive engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’ are by nature elusive
notions that will receive a more precise content in concrete situations. They rep-
resent nonetheless a significant departure from a civilian only Union: the use of
force, albeit as a last resort, is deemed necessary in specific circumstances. This
message, ‘soft power plus’, should be welcomed in Washington.1 
Yet, some pundits, especially American ones, may consider that the soft power
side is by far more important than the hard part of European power. The balance
between realism and idealism is always precarious. Of course, every foreign pol-
icy initiative contains both dimensions, and there is always a fake antagonism
between these two poles. Nonetheless, for the Union, these two dimensions rep-
resent national sensitivities. The risk of disagreements and divisions inside the
Union is thus real. For example, the deliberately vague notion of ‘preventive
engagement’ carries a message of a more proactive Europe but at the same time,
it solemnly echoes UN principles. If humanitarian tasks are obvious examples of
uncontroversial preventive actions, a UN mandate is not deemed an obligation
since the intervention in Kosovo, perceived as legitimate by a majority of EU
members. So the Venus-like image of a Kantian Europe has been modified
towards a more realist conception of the Union’s security interests. Yet, between
June and December 2003, the compromise found between the English insistence
on ‘effective’ policies and the German traditional interest in UN multilateralism
shifted to Berlin’s advantage. This change is partly due to the new enthusiasm of
France towards the UN, partly to European public opinion’s preference for UN
legitimacy. For example, one of the last proposals in European defence con-
cerned the creation of ‘battlegroups’ (1500 troops), a new and more flexible
force package. In the draft agreement between London, Paris and Berlin reached
in February 2004, the link between the UN and the deployment of these ‘battle-
groups’ is explicitly mentioned.2 Because this concept was a direct lesson of
1. On this dimension, see Jean-Yves Haine, ‘The EU Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?’, Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 5(1), Winter 2003/ Spring 2004, pp. 69-77 and Sven Biscop,
‘The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’. Royal
Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Brussels, Sécurité et Stratégie No. 82, March 2004. 
2. The exact wording of the text is: ‘These forces will be designed specifically, but not exclusively,
to be used in response to request from the UN’. Emphasis added. Quoted in Burkard Schmitt,
‘European Capabilities: How Many Divisions’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), ESDP: The first five years,
EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, pp. 98-99. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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Operation Artemis in Congo, the tacit understanding was that this force would
mainly be used in Africa, where a UN mandate is perceived as a political obli-
gation, especially in Germany. Current hesitations about what to in Sudan and
the European willingness to choose the UN route even to the point of inaction
are a good indication that the UN is indeed ‘a cornerstone’ for the Union. 
In the same vein, the Union’s approach to stability and nation-building is far
more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington. It
includes police personnel – the Union has a reserve of 5000 police officers that
could be sent abroad – civil administration and civil protection officials and
civilian authorities and justice officers to strengthen the rule of law. In that
respect, five Member States have recently agreed to set up a European gendar-
merie, that will be able to conduct peace-keeping operations that do not require
the advanced skills of soldiers but are too dangerous for NGOs. According to
the French Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, who sponsored the project,
‘in all crises, the purely military phase is systematically followed by a civilian-
military phase where the aspect of maintaining order becomes increasingly
important’.1 The idea is to bridge the gap between military and civilian EU
peacekeeping operations and to provide the EU or any other international force
with a military police force, specialised in crisis management. This emphasis on
preventive diplomacy in the UN fashion or post-conflict stabilization reinforces
the soft side of the Union. 
Yet, as far as terrorism is concerned, it should be noted that some big European
players have introduced the concept of pre-emption in their doctrinal thinking
and their official doctrine.2 So it seems odd that the wording ‘pre-emption’ was
ultimately changed. Behind this debate lies the old controversy about the appli-
cation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the elusive notion of immediate
danger. A crucial test of this latent controversy about the use of force, among
Europeans as well as vis-à-vis the US, will come sooner rather than later in the
case of Iran’s willingness to acquire nuclear weapons. The new assertiveness of
the Union regarding the Iranian nuclear program was a good indicator of the
progress achieved. The display of unity among the big Three sharply differed
with their ongoing disagreements about Iraq. Yet the agreement reached last
1. Quoted in Richard Carter, ‘Five member states to establish European Gendarmerie’, EU
Observer, 15 September 2004. This European Gendarmerie Force will consist of 800 men, based in
Italy, and should be deployable on the ground within a maximum of 30 days. It should be opera-
tional by the end of 2005. 
2. France has recognized the concept of pre-emption in her last Loi de Programmation militaire. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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October is now obsolete.1 If there is a difference between the Union and the US
on that matter, it lies in the distinction between reputational and strategic inter-
est. Although no EU officials will admit it publicly, the danger rests more in the
fatal blow that a nuclear Iran will represent for the non-proliferation regime
than in the nuclear capacity of Tehran. For Washington, an Islamic Republic
with nuclear weapons is just plainly unacceptable. In any case, theological dis-
cussions on that matter are useless, pragmatism and coordination will be the
rule. 
II. Mars in Europe: Where Are We? 
The area of security and defence has seen indisputable progress in the last couple
of years. Despite the divisions over Iraq, the year 2003 witnessed a crucial agree-
ment on EU-NATO relations, the EU’s first police missions on the Balkans and
the first autonomous military operation, in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A decision has been reached to take over the NATO peace-keeping mission in
Bosnia. This coming operation will represent the Union’s biggest undertaking so
far. In intelligence and counter-terrorism activities, new efforts towards inte-
grated actions have been launched. In the area of proliferation, the Union has
adopted a clear framework for action and pressure to strengthen the non-prolif-
eration regimes and has initiated an unprecedented coordination effort vis-à-vis
Iran. All of this would have been unthinkable just five years ago. Yet, several
failures stand out. In terms of foreign policy coordination, European big pow-
ers, more often than not, keep the illusion of acting alone while small powers
tend to pass the buck to the Union without providing the necessary resources to
back these new responsibilities. Vis-à-vis the US, the need for a common
approach is crucial, yet most members tend to favour their own special relation-
ship with Washington. This leads to an obvious lack of effective impact, as the
paralysis of the Middle East peace process demonstrates. Even when there is a
genuine common approach, the inability to achieve the desired results is some-
times manifest, as the Cyprus failure has shown. Moreover, the Union is full of
declaratory principles, but often short on actual implementation. 
1. On this point, see Christopher de Bellaigue, ‘Big Deal in Iran’, The New York Review of Books,
26 February 2004, pp. 30-33. On the need for a coordinated approach, see for example Robert J.
Einhorn, ‘A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
27(4), Autumn 2004, pp. 21-32. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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Most importantly, the capabilities aspect of ESDP is still lagging behind. The
original objective set at Helsinki – up to 60 000 troops deployable within 60
days – has not been met. This postponement is damaging, since demands for
security are increasing, both internally, as the Madrid bombings have demon-
strated, and externally, as crises deepen in Sudan and Congo. Moreover, stability
in the Balkans remains tentative. Several problems have plagued the Helsinki
Headline Goal. First, it was merely a quantitative target designed after the Bos-
nian experience, and therefore, ill-suited to today’s new strategic imperatives.
Second, it was just a catalogue of forces, only ten per cent of which were actually
rapidly deployable. Third, if deficiencies were identified, there were no real
incentives to remedy them. Briefly put, efforts on capabilities have to shift from
the quantitative to the qualitative. 
Several recent developments took this necessity into account. First, building on
the success of Operation Artemis, EU defence ministers have endorsed the con-
cept of ‘battlegroups’. Battlegroups of 1 500 troops, including support elements,
represent a more flexible force package capable of higher-intensity operations.
Deployable within 15 days, they will be fully manned, equipped and trained,
and have sufficient strategic lift assets. The aim is to establish 2 to 3 battlegroups
by next year, and 7 to 9 by 2007. This target must not be missed. Second, it was
decided to establish a European Defence Agency to ‘support the Member States
in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis man-
agement’. The Agency will thus promote equipment collaboration, research and
technology projects and procurement. All this should bring invaluable synergies
and economies of scale to the way Europeans spend scarce resources on defence.
In particular, the Agency should be able to coordinate efforts to fill the gaps
identified by the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). In order to have a
real impact, the Agency must be properly funded. Third, the principle of perma-
nent structured cooperation for defence is now recognized by the draft Consti-
tution. The criteria governing this cooperation are stringent, at least on paper:
among other things, Member States must have an adequate level of defence
expenditure, take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability,
flexibility and deployability of their armed forces and commit resources to
address shortfalls identified by the ECAP mechanism. The real novelty lies in the
encouragement to coordinate the identification of military needs, to specialise
national defence and to pool capabilities. Given the weakness of defence budgets
and the chronic under-investment in R&T, collective procurement and multina-
tional forces are obvious solutions. If implemented, permanent structured coop-
eration could offer a precious framework in which to change the dynamics ofAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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European defence. These improvements offer the promise of a bigger bang for
the Euro. 
III. Hard Issues to Be Addressed
Europe has developed a comprehensive approach to security, from police mis-
sions to crisis management. Fulfilling the less demanding aspects of peacekeep-
ing operations, like the future Bosnia mission, cannot slow down the necessary
transformation of European forces. In a report published by the EU Institute for
Security Studies, an independent task force of security and defence experts has
recommended ways to achieve a more capable Europe.1 Noting that its capacity
for autonomous action is currently severely limited by deficiencies in deploya-
bility and sustainability, and following the objectives spelled out by the Euro-
pean Security Strategy, the task force has proposed several initiatives that the
Union should implement as soon as possible. 
Deployability should be increased. Up to 50 per cent of European forces must
become deployable at any given time for operations outside the EU or to face
consequences of catastrophic terrorism. This objective should be fulfilled within
10 years. At the moment, only 10 per cent of the committed forces within the
Union are deployable. European countries have almost 1.5 million men under
arms but can only deploy 150 000 troops. Sustainability should be improved.
The Union must be able to sustain 60 000 combat troops for 3 years. At present,
the Union’s members are unable to sustain a 50 000-troop operation (20 bri-
gades) over a number of years. The highest priority should be put on C4ISTAR,
which is a critical enabler for any EU mission.2 The EU force projection capa-
bility should be enlarged with new force packaging. The EU political and mili-
tary authorities must first be aware of forces in Europe that remain outside the
catalogue. This would give them a clearer picture of the overall reality of Euro-
pean forces. These authorities should secondly set up a certification mechanism
for EU forces according to the different missions that these forces could be called
upon to undertake. This certification must be given at the EU level. 
1. See Jean-Yves Haine (Rapporteur), European Defence. A proposal for a White Paper, Report of
an Independent Task Force, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004. 
2. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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To enhance deployability and sustainability, a standing strategic headquarters is
deemed necessary. A mobile deployable operational headquarters should simi-
larly be set up. This headquarters should be able to call upon standing EU forces
for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. A nucleus of standing joint
combat forces at the disposal of the Union will greatly facilitate the military
planning and political decision-making processes when launching operations.
This standing force should be organised at the level of battlegroups, i.e. 1 500
men, complemented by air and naval components. Planning at the European
level should include network-enabled operations, which are key to European
military transformation. So far, only a handful of countries have begun to incor-
porate this revolution in military affairs in their defence planning. The EU Mil-
itary Staff could be tasked with deepening and coordinating these efforts
towards European network-enabled capabilities, based on a European transfor-
mation concept. 
In order to increase the harmonisation of doctrine among EU members, a doc-
trine centre is necessary. A European Defence College could bring together mil-
itary and civilian personnel from all EU countries in order to promote a com-
mon strategic culture that incorporates new doctrines and concepts. A common
culture is also an indispensable component of a common strategy for Europe.
Since European operations do exist, a common doctrine should underpin them.
In the interest of harmonisation, a European fund for force transformation
could be set up in the Agency. Economic incentives at the European level must
support national efforts. National reforms and transformation must follow
European guidelines and procedures. As a minimum, co-financing of national
capabilities should achieve better efficiency. 
At the European level, a Council of Defence Ministers should be considered.
Only regular meetings will be able to provide the necessary continuity and
coherence in defence policy in the Union. As far as the NATO Response Force
is concerned, it should be available to both NATO and the EU. In its current
plans, this rapid reaction force is made up entirely of European forces, and it is
mainly a mechanism for developing European military forces in qualitative
terms. EU Member States, together with the EU’s political and military author-
ities, should consider the drawing up of a fully-fledged European Defence White
Book in order to set priorities and to collectively identify corresponding capa-
bility shortfalls and remedies. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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Transformation of European forces is indeed crucial. If the lack of investment in
capabilities continues, even the capacity to operate with the US will be lost. The
25 members currently spend around 160 billion Euro on defence and have
nearly 1.5 million men under arms. Yet, the Union is barely able to rapidly
deploy 10 per cent of that number. A single market for defence procurement
could save 6 billion Euro a year. The overall aim is thus to better allocate and
coordinate scarce resources. To achieve that, more Europe, not less, is needed. 
A deep structural force that will push Europe to become a genuine international
security actor is at play. Firstly, since the conflict in the Balkans in the early
1990s, there is a common acknowledgment among Member States that acting
together is a necessary condition for success. Secondly, the American experience
with pre-emption and state-building, without mentioning the spread of democ-
racy, has produced serious disappointment and frustration in the Arab world
and the Atlantic community. Recent polls show the dramatic decrease of trust
about Washington’s intentions. The United States thinks itself as the exceptional
nation whose mission is to lead the world. But between this benevolent self-
image and the way the rest of the world feels about and resents US actions, the
gap is becoming wider and wider. This estrangement could have serious conse-
quences for US foreign policy. Two different directions are likely. Having recog-
nized the cost of acting alone, Washington could decide to reinvest in institution-
alized alliances and partnerships, as indeed the Bush administration has begun
to do. But an opposite scenario is also possible whereby Washington, already
overstretched in Iraq, will focus on homeland defence and disengage from
Europe. The worst scenario would be a new isolationist America and a still very
weak Europe. Either way, Europe’s vacation from geopolitics is over. Demands
for more international responsibilities from inside as well from outside the
Union will rise. To act now is to be prepared for the future. The credibility of
the Union as an international security actor is at stake. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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4. EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM: 
BRINGING THE EUROPEAN WAY INTO PRACTICE
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop
Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels
Professor of European Security, University of Gent
The best way of summarizing the European Security Strategy, the ‘European
way’, is ‘effective multilateralism’, the last of three strategic objectives named in
the Strategy. Effective Multilateralism – ‘the development of a stronger interna-
tional society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based inter-
national order’ as the Strategy has it – concerns the global level, the world sys-
tem itself, and as such addresses the long-term, underlying factors determining
peace and security, and that by multilateral means, by cooperating with others. 
The other two strategic objectives in the Strategy are implied by Effective Mul-
tilateralism. ‘Building security in our neighbourhood’ is the application of the
same principles in the proximity of the EU, not because of any hierarchy of
objectives, but because the EU has the means, and perhaps even the duty, to
directly play the leading role itself in its own neighbourhood, rather than acting
through the UN and the other multilateral bodies as it will at the global level.
‘Addressing the threats’ demands a number of immediate measures in the polit-
ico-military field, but can only succeed in the long-term through the root causes
approach of Effective Multilateralism. 
I. Effective Multilateralism = Global Governance
Effective Multilateralism can best be understood as an effective system of global
governance, i.e. a system able to ensure at the global level access to the core
public goods that at the national level the State provides – or is supposed to – to
its citizens: stability and security, an enforceable legal order, an open and inclu-
sive economic order and global welfare in all of its aspects (such as access to
health, a clean environment, education etc.). These are global public goods to
which everybody should have access, including future generations. The different
global public goods are inherently related: they can only be fully enjoyed if one
has access to them all. Too large a gap between haves and have-nots in terms of
access to global public goods is the ultimate systemic threat to Europe’s security:AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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at a certain level of inequality the resulting political instability, extremisms, eco-
nomic unpredictability and massive migration flows will become uncontrolla-
ble.1 Although it is still very broad, the concept of global public goods renders
it easier to operationalize, almost to visualize even, global governance; it also
allows for a clear delineation of policy priorities. The Strategy does not
explicitly mention the concept, but its implicit presence is evident: ‘The best
protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’. 
If in the Strategy the EU recognizes the inseparable links between all the dimen-
sions of Effective Multilateralism, between the different global public goods,
then it must act accordingly in implementing the Strategy.2 This implies
accepting the Strategy as the strategic framework, i.e. as determining the choice
of objectives and the development of instruments and means, not just for ESDP
and CFSP, but for all of EU external action, across the pillars, from trade and
development to international environmental and police cooperation. Here lies
potentially the greatest added value of the Strategy: providing the stimulus for
the effective integration of all EU external policies. For the EU already possesses
the full range of instruments, up to the military, only they are not always put to
use in a consistent manner; all too often still, policies in one field of external
action are contradictory with those in other areas. The adoption of the Strategy
has created the opportunity to structurally change this. 
II. The Regional Level: Neighbourhood Policy
At the regional level of the EU’s neighbourhood, the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) certainly goes in the right direction. Comprehensive bilateral
action plans with an emphasis on detailed mutual commitments and ‘positive
conditionality’ are to promote political and economic reform. Perhaps the fields
of CFSP/ESDP could be included in the action plans, so as to stimulate politico-
military cooperation as well, such as detaching liaison officers to the EU Mili-
1. Rik Coolsaet & Valérie Arnould, ‘Global Governance: The Next Frontier’. IRRI-KIIB, Brussels,
Egmont Paper No. 2, April 2004, www.irri-kiib.be/papers/egmontp2.U561.pdf. 
2. Sven Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Secu-
rity’. Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Brussels, Sécurité et Stratégie No. 82, March 2004,
www.irri-kiib.be/papers/Artikel%20V&S%20ESS.pdf. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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tary Staff, observing and participating in ESDP exercises and manoeuvres, and
eventually participating in EU operations. The ultimate objective in that field is
an effective security partnership, i.e. joint mechanisms for early warning, con-
flict prevention and crisis management, based on a common strategic assess-
ment. With regard to the Mediterranean e.g., the EU has already offered exten-
sive involvement to its partners, but so far these have been very reluctant to
accept the invitation. Care should be taken when developing the ENP not to
ignore the acquis of existing frameworks such as the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership (EMP), notably as concerns multilateral, region-wide programmes and
activities. In fact, the ENP offers a window of opportunity to revitalize the EMP,
which has stagnated, obviously because of the Middle East conflict that clouds
the whole of the region, but also because of a lack of effort and concessions on
the part of the EU, particularly with regard to the agricultural market. For ‘pos-
itive conditionality’ to work, real ‘carrots’ must be offered and clear bench-
marks must be agreed. In the end though, effective democratization can only
happen when external stimuli can support local actors to start an internal proc-
ess of reform. 
III. The Global Level: Empowering the UN
At the global level, the EU has less direct leverage, but it can make a significant
contribution both to the improvement of mechanisms and institutions for global
governance and to the alleviation of specific conflict or humanitarian situations
by supporting the UN and the associated multilateral bodies. 
At the end of 2003 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan established a High-Level
Panel with the aim of recommending, by the end of 2004, measures to enable
the Security Council in particular to take swift and effective collective action in
the face of threats to peace and security. In a way very similar to an earlier
exercise by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), which in 2001 published its report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, the
Panel could lead to a political consensus on a policy framework outlining the
types of situations that demand action by the international community.1 This is
the case when States harm their own populations, when national sovereignty
must yield to ‘the responsibility to protect’ on the part of the multilateral system
1. ICISS, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre,
2001, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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– the focus of the ICISS report – but also when States do not live up to their
commitments towards their neighbours and the international community, e.g.
by violating non-proliferation agreements, by actively supporting terrorist
groups or by the illegal use of force. The consistent use of such a framework to
judge situations should ensure that they come to the attention of the Security
Council at an early stage – and the earlier the intervention, the smaller the need
for military action – and in the face of public opinion would make it more
difficult for the Security Council not to act. It would thus also deprive those that
prefer to act unilaterally from the excuse of UN inaction. 
In a May 2004 contribution to the High-Level Panel, the transmission of which
the Council approved, this line of action is supported.1 A process is suggested
to the Security Council of engaging a violating State in dialogue, offering
support for redressing of the situation, including through the deployment of
civilian missions, but with the option of having recourse to targeted sanctions
and, as a last resort, military intervention if the State does not respond. This
contribution to the High-Level Panel is in effect much more unambiguous on the
use of force than the Strategy itself; in the light of the implementation of
Effective Multilateralism, it deserves the EU’s unequivocal support. 
In the end of course the political will of the members of the Security Council and
of the UN Member States in general will determine whether action is taken or
not. On the part of the EU, the will has clearly been expressed to launch opera-
tions as ‘subcontractor’ to the UN, making use of the ‘battlegroup concept’ pro-
viding for the creation of 1500-strong rapidly deployable force packages. The
EU and the UN already closely cooperate in the field of conflict prevention and
early warning and in September 2003 a joint declaration on cooperation on
crisis management was signed. 
Next to this global politico-military dimension, the EU must make a similar
contribution in the other fields of global governance as well. For Effective Mul-
tilateralism to be implemented, enhancing social, economic and environmental
governance are equally important. E.g. the EU could step up its efforts to pro-
mote reform of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) so as to enable
it to play a central role in crisis management in case of financial crisis, economic
stagnation or famine, when a large number of different actors have to be
1. ‘Paper for Submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’. http://
ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU%20written%20contribution2.pdf. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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brought together, next to its traditional role of coordinating different spheres of
economic and social development. In these other fields as well, the EU is enhanc-
ing concrete cooperation with the UN. On 28 June 2004 the Commission and
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) announced a strategic partnership
focussing on governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction,
with particular attention for countries that emerge from conflict. This is to be
the first in a series of partnerships with UN agencies. 
In the longer term, the objective of Security Council reform, which is inherently
related to the task of the High-Level Panel, should be kept in mind. Legitimacy
of decisions is a very important determinant of the success of collective action
and is closely linked to the composition of the decision-making body. A mid-
term option certainly worth exploring is a more structured partnership between
the Security Council and regional organizations, which can act as ‘local agents’
on behalf of the Security Council. Ultimately, a composition based on regional
groupings seems to be the best possible way to achieve a better balance. 
IV. A Distinctive European Approach 
The links between all fields of external action that are inherent to Effective Mul-
tilateralism must not only be reflected in EU policies at the global and regional
levels, but also in EU institutions and decision-making, for the elaboration of
integrated policies to be at all possible. The single External Action Service that
is provided for in the Constitution should thus be conceived as comprising all
the relevant directorates from the Commission and the Council Secretariat,
while the Union Foreign Minister could act as a very effective driving force. The
implementation of the ESS is thus closely linked to the institutional reforms in
the Constitution. 
The question could rightly be asked whether all the very diverse dimensions of
Effective Multilateralism still fit under the title of ‘security’. On the one hand, a
number of observers from e.g. the development sector and the peace movement,
and from countries in the South, fear ‘securitization’, i.e. that all of the EU’s
external policies would be driven by ‘hard’ security concerns and would thus see
the use of politico-military instruments. On the other hand it is feared that by
widening the notion of ‘security’ too much, it becomes meaningless. Perhaps the
solution is to turn it around. Is not the ‘EU way’ that we do not address issues
as security problems, but as governance, development, environmental issuesAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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etc., unless they pose an effective politico-military threat to the local population,
to a region, to the EU or to the international community? Perhaps then ‘Euro-
pean Security Strategy’ was not such a good title after all – a Comprehensive
Strategy for External Action is what it should be, and what it will be if Effective
Multilateralism is effectively implemented. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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5. BUILDING UP EU MILITARY CAPABILITIES: 
AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS
Major-General (rtd.) Kees Homan
Senior Research Fellow, the Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, The Hague
At the December 2003 Brussels summit the EU adopted the European Security
Strategy. The document has three basic parts. First, it calls for the EU to contrib-
ute more resources to establishing economic and political stability in its neigh-
bourhood. Second, it calls on the EU to build an international order. And third,
it calls on the EU to strengthen its civil and military capacity to deal with the
threat of weapons of mass destruction and rogue states. The Strategy has a glo-
bal and comprehensive approach to Europe’s security interests and threats. 
Due to the vagueness of the Strategy – 25 governments had to agree on the
document – everybody liked it. France loved it because it would create a
multipolar world to counter American dominance. Germany loved it because it
would build an international order. Britain, Spain, Portugal and the 10 new EU
members loved it because it stresses the importance of maintaining good rela-
tions with America and the Atlantic Alliance. Even the United States liked this
part. Still we have to acknowledge that within the EU there are political divi-
sions over how to handle the US and there is also a lack of consensus on when
and in what circumstances force should be used. 
The Strategy implicitly emphasizes the need to stabilise the arc of instability
which runs around the EU’s Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern flanks; and
the need to prevent the worst kind of disaster in those parts of the world, nota-
bly sub-Saharan Africa. It is clear that EU policy towards its near abroad will
also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US
to put out fires in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the
British-French initiative at St-Malô in 1998 was to improve the EU’s poor per-
formance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. 
As the Strategy acknowledges, EU institutions and governments have seldom
joined together their various policies on trade, aid, development, immigration
and counter-terrorism. But it is an important potential strength of the EU that it
can draw on a broad spectrum of soft and hard power resources. If a war doesAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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break out, the EU needs to be able to deploy rapid reaction forces to end the
conflict, and then provide peacekeepers and other essential personnel – such as
policemen, engineers and judges – to help rebuild the country.
For a long time, the EU was a civilian-only organization. After a slow start in
the early 1990s to develop a defence policy, since 1999 the EU is in the process
of formulating and establishing the military capabilities for a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). At the EU’s Helsinki Summit of December 1999, EU
member states committed themselves to a military ‘Headline Goal’. By the year
2003, the EU should have been able to deploy 60 000 troops for the so-called
Petersberg missions. Although the Helsinki Headline Goal was declared for-
mally met in 2003, the Thessalonica European Council in June 2003 acknowl-
edged that the EU operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks
was still limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. Several problems
plagued the Headline Goal. It was just a catalogue of forces, only ten percent of
which were actually rapidly deployable. And if deficiencies were identified, there
were no real incentives to remedy them.
The new Headline Goal 2010 focuses on the need for qualitative improvements
to put existing defence capabilities at the service of the whole range of crisis
management operations included in the revised Petersberg tasks. However, qual-
itative capabilities are difficult to measure. One may expect that the military
capabilities of EU Member States will fall short of their declared ambitions for
years to come. This is underlined by the Capabilities Improvement Chart 2004,
listing 64 capability shortfalls and catalogue deficits. This document states that
for 7 capabilities the situation has been solved, for 4 capabilities the situation
has improved, but for 53 capabilities the situation has remained approximately
the same. Presently the 25 EU Member States can barely deploy 85 000 out of
a total of 1.2 million ground soldiers. From both a defence planner’s point of
view, and from that of the taxpayer, Europe’s armies need urgent reform. But
more capable European forces will require serious investment.
It has to be recognized that the effects that European nations can bring to
today’s crises are too fragmented and peppered with capability gaps; insuffi-
ciently coordinated or not properly equipped or structured for modern missions;
and not cost-effective because of inefficiencies in industry and procurement. As
mentioned above, attempts by the EU to remedy this situation have enjoyed
limited success. Europeans’ progress towards modernising and re-equipping
their armies is painfully slow. But the launch of the European Defence AgencyAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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(EDA) gives EU Member States an opportunity to make a new start. The overall
mission of the EDA is to carve more effective capabilities from roughly the same
collective budget, since nobody expects European defence budgets to increase in
real terms. However, there is clearly a risk that the perceived obsession in Brus-
sels with process and bureaucracy could undermine the effectiveness of the
EDA. It will require strong leadership and a focus on real capability improve-
ments from defence ministers, as well as from the Agency’s own staff, to prevent
this.
The sovereignty of the Member States still is a big obstacle for overcoming the
EU’s military capability shortfalls. Task specialisation as the ultimate solution
for a much more capable EU is only possible if Member States are willing to
surrender some of their sovereign authority in the area of defence. But this is still
considered as a non-starter by EU Member States.
At least the EU should think more about sharing military capabilities. Pooling
can be a partial solution for meeting European military shortfalls. It offers the
opportunity for lower overhead costs, and the resources released might then be
used to fund new enabling capabilities. Pooled forces also would drive moves to
greater interoperability and common doctrine and equipment. Pooling is not a
new or untried idea. NATO fields a supranational capability: the jointly owned
and operated AWACS force. The budgetary advantages of governments collab-
orating on, for example, a common fleet of air transport planes, or air-tankers,
or UAVs, are potentially huge. In this way each country could save money on
bases, servicing, maintenance and training. An example of pooling is the Euro-
pean Air Group Coordination Cell (EACC), which coordinates the military
transport flights of the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands.
It has led to a more efficient use of transport capacity and over time can lead to
cost-savings. There are relatively few disadvantages of pooling from a political
perspective. This type of cooperation has the greatest chance of success in the
short term.
There is also money to be saved through role specialisation. Even the larger
European countries cannot maintain every sort of military capability on limited
budgets. For example, it would not make sense for several European air forces
separately to develop the capacity to destroy hostile radar systems.
A recent important initiative, which is achievable in the short term, is the launch
of the ‘battlegroup concept’. The rationale for these EU battlegroups is to giveAUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The aim is to provide
rapid response capabilities by directing Member States towards a catalogue of
high-utility force packages that can be tailored to specific missions, usable as an
individual unit or combined together with units of the same nature. The experi-
ence of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was the
first EU-led military operation launched in June 2003 at the request of the UN
Security Council, is a typical scenario for which the battlegroups may be
deployed.
The key element of that force is a coherent, credible battlegroup consisting of
around 1500 combat soldiers including (combat) support elements. The core of
a battlegroup has more or less the size of an infantry battalion backed up with
the needed combat support and combat service support, such as logistics and
strategic lift capabilities. The force should be deployed within 15 days to
respond to a crisis and should be sustainable for at least 30 days.
What does the EU’s military operational balance-sheet look like so far? In the
year 2003 the EU conducted operations for the first time: the EU Police Mission
in Bosnia, Operation Concordia in Macedonia (300 troops) and the autono-
mous Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2000 troops).
Those were rather small missions. At the end of 2004 the EU will take over
NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (EUFOR). This commitment will
represent its largest operation so far and will involve several thousand military
personnel and police forces for a longer period of time. This operation, making
use of NATO assets and capabilities, will constitute the first real litmus test of
EU military and civilian capabilities.
In conclusion, for the foreseeable future EU military missions are either going to
be small, and in effect British and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to
rely upon NATO and/or American support, as they do in the Balkans. AUDIT OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY
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6. THE PARTICIPATING INSTITUTES
http://www.irri-kiib.be
fpc.org.uk
www.britishcouncil.org/belgium
www.newdefenceagenda.org